We analyze the evolution of the exporter wage premium (EWP) during the Great Recession and the resulting impact on wage inequality in Germany.
Introduction
The recent nancial crisis went along with plummeting world trade and one of the worst recessions since World War II. Surprisingly, the German labor market proved to be relatively robust to the negative shocks associated with the global recession. Explanations for this so called German Job Miracle comprise institutional factors, such as working time accounts and short-time work, which created a strong buering capacity among rms and allowed them to cushion the shock (cf. Moeller; 2010) .
We argue that recent research on international trade suggests another margin of adjustment for rms that seek to decrease labor costs in times of low demand. In the model by Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) , workers employed by exporters earn higher wages than workers employed by non-exporters since wages are linked to operating prots by a fair-wage mechanism. Empirical support for the existence of such an Exporter Wage Premium (EWP) in the case of Germany is given by Schank et al. (2007) and Baumgarten (2013) . Hauptmann and Schmerer (2013) show that it mainly stems from a larger wage drift in exporting rms. Since cutting the wage drift (e.g. in the form of lower bonus payments) is a comparatively painless way to quickly reduce labor costs, German rms might have taken advantage of this instrument to compensate the costs of labor-hoarding.
Given that export-oriented rms have been hit more intensively by the crisis than purely domestic rms (Moeller; 2010) , one would expect the wage adjustment to be stronger for exporters and the EWP to fall. Since the upward-trend of the EWP during the 2000s has proven to be inequality-increasing (cf. Baumgarten; 2013) , a decrease of the EWP should work in the opposite direction.
Our contribution to the existing literature is to characterize the evolution of the EWP during the nancial crisis, the mechanism causing its reduction, and its impact on wage inequality. Our central result is that the EWP decreased already at the dawn of the crisis and stagnated thereafter. This pattern is due to exporting rms starting to adjust their wage-setting one year earlier than non-exporters, possibly as a reaction to the sharp decline in foreign orders, visible already in late 2007. Finally, our decomposition results show that the decline of the EWP had a negative and persistent impact on wage inequality 1 during the crisis, especially on residual wage inequality.
Data and Methods
For the empirical analysis, we use the LIAB (version LIAB QM2 9310 v1), a large matched employer-employee dataset provided by the Institute for Employment Research and replicate the specication of Baumgarten (2013) , who uses the exact same dataset. We also restrict the sample to male full-time workers at the age between 18 and 65 in regular employment.
1 Censored wages are imputed following Gartner (2005) and all wages are converted into year-2010 euros. For the main analysis, we use the years 2007-2010.
Our specication, which we estimate separately for each year, is:
where ln(w) if t denotes the logarithm of worker i's daily real wage including bonus payments, working in rm f in year t. 2 exp f t is a dummy variable indicating rm f 's exporter status in t. X if t denotes a rich set of controls for worker characteristics, including 20 skill-group-age dummies, foreign nationality, a quadratic term in tenure and a dummy for being a master craftsman or foreman. The vector of rm characteristics P f t varies by specication: dummies for IT-investments and technological state (tech), rm or industry level wage agreements (bargain), a quadratic term of ln employment (size), and all plant controls jointly plus dummies for works council and 1-plant rm (full).
3
The baseline specication does not include any rm-level controls apart from the export dummy. I f t and F f t denote industry-and federal state dummies and are included in all models.
Despite the rich set of controls, estimating equation (1) with OLS does not ensure that we capture the causal eect of exporting on wages in a given year. On the one hand, 1 Because the facilitation of short time work (STW) in 2009 was an emergency measure, hours reductions and wage subsidies usually did not even enter social security records. Our data therefore does not allow to identify workers in STW. However, since the wage in our data is the stipulated wage before STW, any wage adjustment we observe is not mechanical. 2 The data are sampled at the end of June and thus include all workers employed by the rm at this point in time. 3 See table A1 for summary statistics of the main variables.
according to models with heterogeneous rms, more productive rms become exporters and grow larger at the same time and there should not be a premium conditional on size (cf. Melitz; 2003; Baumgarten; 2013 For our analysis of the EWP's impact on wage inequality, we employ the method described by Lemieux (2002) , which decomposes the change in wage inequality (measured by the standard deviation) between two years t 0 and t 1 into dierent components. To this end, we construct several counterfactual distributions that allow us to disentangle the impact of changes of 1) the EWP, 2) other coecients, 3) covariates, and 4) residuals on residual wage inequality by sequentially changing the components of the OLS models.
Whereas a change of coecients is easily obtained from the OLS estimates, a change of covariates is performed via reweighting.
3 The EWP during the nancial crisis 3.1 Baseline Results Figure 1 shows the EWP's change over time. Each line represents a dierent specication of equation (1). 5 The estimates indicate that the EWP increased since the beginning of We do not carry out panel regressions as in Schank et al. (2007) , since cross-sectional OLS estimates are needed for the subsequent decomposition. 5 Tables A2-A5 in the web appendix present the full tables for all covariates. 6 When controlling for plant size, the rise of the EWP starts in 2005 and is insignicant before. However, as argued in the last section, the point estimates likely are downwards biased in these specications. In general, the results provide evidence that exporters and non-exporters reacted to the adverse shock by adjusting their wage-regime and the main dierence is that exporters started to adjust their wage-setting one year earlier. Table A9 shows that in real terms, wages declined in exporting rms and remained constant in nonexporting rms. 8 One concern might be that these eects stem from rms exiting or entering the sample. In appendix table A7, we therefore restrict the sample to rms that are observed in two consecutive years, which does not qualitatively alter our results. The results in general suggest that the decrease of the EWP contributed to the fact that residual wage inequality did not further increase during the crisis.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis provides rst evidence on the contribution of the exporter wage premium to changes in wage inequality during the nancial crisis. The EWP decreased signicantly at the beginning of the crisis but stagnated afterwards. We are able to shed light on the reason behind this pattern, which appears to be the consequence of exporting rms 9 Table A10 in the web appendix shows the same decomposition for total inequality rather than residual inequality. It turns out that the EWP also had a notable impact on overall inequality. However, the results are not as large and statistically signicant. Notes: 'Total Eect' denotes the change of overall residual wage inequality (measured by the standard deviation) between two periods. 'EWP Eect' denotes the change in residual wage inequality which can be attributed to the change of the EWP. Standard errors in parentheses, based on 200 bootstrap replications. Levels of signicance: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %.
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Firms that are not observed in both years of a regression are dropped. t denotes the earlier one of the two years in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at plant level. Levels of signicance: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %. Notes: Estimates are based on the baseline specication in columns 1, 3, 6, and the full specication in columns 2, 4, 6. t denotes the earlier one of the two years in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at plant level. Levels of signicance: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %. Notes: 'Total Eect' denotes the change of overall wage inequality (measured by the standard deviation) between two periods. 'EWP Eect' denotes the change in wage inequality which can be attributed to the change of the EWP. Standard errors in parentheses, based on 200 bootstrap replications. Levels of signicance: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %.
